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Analysis
Multipolarity as resistance to
liberal norms: Russia’s position
on responsibility to protect
Xymena Kurowska
In Western analysis, Russia’s insistence on the
supremacy of international law serves as little
more than a strategy to sustain parity with the
West. The Kremlin’s justification of its use
of responsibility to protect is seen as an
abuse of humanitarian language and a
smokescreen in the pursuit of geopolitical
interests. Formulated from within the liberal
paradigm, such interpretations underestimate
the normative saturation of strategic action.
This article examines Russia’s discourse of
multipolarity not as being purely strategic—
as is widely held—but rather as a form of
resistance to the perceived liberal hegemony of
the West. The effects of such resistance
resemble the outcomes of strategic
manoeuvring but they should not be reduced
to such. Bolstered by a sense of betrayal by the
West, Russia’s evolving discourse of
multipolarity provides an alternative vision
of the world order that contests the imposition
of liberal values and bestows upon the
authorities an actual responsibility to
contain the West’s dominance. Both Russia’s
interpretation of responsibility to protect and
its position in the debate arise from this
agenda.
Introduction
The Russian position on responsibility to protect (R2P)1 is seen as contradictory.
Explicitly, Moscow does not set itself against an obligation to protect populations from
q 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is
permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
Xymena Kurowska is an IR theorist interested in interpretive policy analysis. She earned her doctoral degree
from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Her research, writing and teaching concentrate on
interdisciplinary approaches to security and international state-building.
Conflict, Security & Development, 2014
Vol. 14, No. 4, 489–508, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930589
mass atrocities.2 Russian engagement with R2P after the 2005 UN World Summit
demonstrates acquiescence to rather than rejection of the idea of sovereignty as
responsibility, although its understanding of sovereignty does not derive from the liberal
conceptual framework underlying R2P advocacy in the West. Russia is keen to take up the
role of watchdog within Western-driven development of R2P, speaks with irony of the
‘so-called responsibility to protect’, and identifies with the responsibility while protecting
initiative which seeks to curtail the expansive interpretation of R2P.3 Among Western UN
diplomats, the Russian position is differentiated from that of ideological adversaries of the
doctrine, such as Cuba and Venezuela, even though the Russians ‘are very hesitant to add
R2P language’ to any Security Council resolution.4 Their standpoint is often referred to at
the UN as ‘nuanced opposition’ and is organised around three themes: the primacy of
prevention over intervention; the state ownership of the protective process rather than
external imposition; and the sequence of action in which the use of force is the last resort.5
Such position corresponds to the literal reading of the R2P doctrine.
The official Russian stance is that Moscow does not dispute the responsibility of states to
protect their populations or the complementary international responsibility to protect under
the exclusive authority of the Security Council. The Kremlin is instead against its current
implementation,6which is seen to target regime change in linewithWestern democratic peace
theory and democracy promotion.7 Moscow’s objection lies in the forceful imposition of a
liberal system of values which ‘glorifies individual rights over peace and stability’.8 In
opposition to this practice, Moscow claims to be a protector of the UN Charter against the
challenge of what it sees as the ‘creative proliferation’ of R2P. The aim is clear enough: the
insistence on the sovereign equality prescribed by international law against the consolidating
practice of intervention maintains the facade of parity with the West.9 It also provides for an
advantageous position from which to expose the West’s ‘double standards’—i.e. its allegedly
cynical appeals to humanitarianism in a number of military interventions—and as such
creates conditions for Russia to take up the role of the representative of those marginalised in
the international system. However, the charge of double standards cuts both ways: Moscow’s
own practice regarding responsibility to protect Russian-speaking citizens in neighbouring
countries seems to contradict its firm support of the state’s responsibility to protect and it
clashes with the basic premise of non-interference into domestic affairs.
How to make sense of this contradiction? The default analytical position is to attribute
strategic abuse of the humanitarian doctrine to the pursuit of geopolitical goals. But the lens of
hypocrisy provides only a trivial explanation and thus ignores the origins of the current
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controversy. By mechanistically reproducing the template of ‘the Russian menace’,10 it
dismisses Russia’s input into norm contestation, regardless of how illiberal that inputmay be.
Yet the fact that political action is deceptive and that political actors are inherently self-
interested does not exclude the possibility that their interests include certain compatible
norms in the promotion of which Russia may purposefully engage. Accordingly, the aim of
this article is to examine the derivation of Russian resistance to the Western form of
humanitarian intervention and now R2P. It seeks an interpretive explanation of situated
meanings and meaning-making practices of actors in their particular settings rather than
imposing meanings abstracted from specific contexts.11 In order to do so, I investigate
domestic sources of the interpretations, attitudes and practices that Russia brings to the
R2P table.
The reconstruction stems from the observation that ‘a feeling of obida (injury) at perceived
humiliation by the West [ . . . ] became the foundations of policy’,12 and that the current
defiant tone ofRussia’s foreign policy choices is framed by resentment.Historically, Russia has
not been included in the club of the liberal modern states.13 The sense of insufficient
recognition fromWestern capitals has tended to result inMoscowadopting eitherdefensive or
assertive policy postures.14 This trajectory is perhaps best illustrated by Russia’s initial
acceptance of Western normative and strategic leadership following the demise of the Soviet
Union. However, the perceived slights from the West in the 1990s quickly gave rise to the
revival of the great power discourse which resists liberal norms and contests humanitarian
intervention. The failure to indulge this resistance has led to the current administration’s
normative defiance of the liberal world order.
Inherent in this trajectory is the discourse of multipolarity which developed as a central
term in Russia’s domestic lexicon of resistance against the West.15 As a formative foreign
policy concept, the doctrine shapes Russia’s attitude toward other basic norms of
contemporary international society.16 It is employed by scholars and political leaders alike
to envisage an international system which liberates Russia from the normative pull of the
Western hegemonic order. Such a system is fundamentally premised on the idea that
various regional ‘poles’ decide independently on how to implement democratic values and
implicitly emphasises the right of every state to protect its own culture and institutions in
the face of Western dominance.17 As illustrated by Russia’s claim of the duty to protect
compatriots, this right extends from the state to a ‘pole’. At the juncture of foreign policy
and domestic self-image, the Kremlin thus insists on its own vision of ‘sovereign
democracy’ in contrast to liberal democracy.
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The image of Russia as a mistreated great power which has overcome its moment of
weakness to dethrone the West is not a mere fabrication of an authoritarian leadership.
Deeply entrenched at the societal level, it resonates with long-standing historical
grievances and provides a range of normative resources for asserting the ethical and
strategic justification of concrete foreign policy choices. The discourse of multipolarity is
not considered here to be a causal determinant of specific foreign policy outcomes.
Instead, I illustrate how foreign policy formulations and domestically constructed
representations are constitutive of one another.18 While the multipolarity discourse serves
as the starting point of the inquiry, it does not represent either objective reality or a
platform for moral superiority. Without doubt, it functions as a powerful symbolic frame
for the rationalisation of fiercely anti-liberal policy choices. But if we take seriously its
normative underpinnings, the Russian position becomes less contradictory, although no
less antagonistic, than commonly thought.
The article begins by revisiting the significance of the experience of anarchy and chaos in
the 1990s, commonly known as bespredel, to Russia’s constructed sense of betrayal by the
West and impulse to take revenge for this degradation. Initially triggered by the eastward
NATO enlargement process in the mid-1990s, to which Russia strongly objected, the peak
of Moscow’s diplomatic humiliation coincided with the NATO Kosovo campaign in 1999
and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Domestically, Putin’s 2000 election slogan of ‘the
dictatorship of law’19 heralded the comeback of the state as an agent responsible for
restoring stability. At the intersection of domestic and foreign policy, many sympathetic
academics endorsed the resurgent great power discourse and the political agenda of
multipolarity as a potential counter to Western dominance.
Subsequently, I examine the impact of the multipolarity resistance discourse on Russia’s
stance in the R2P debate. Here, Brazil, China, India and South Africa tend to associate with
the Russian normative agenda of curbing liberal norms and its claim to represent the
unrepresented in the UN. The homogeneity of the group should not be taken for granted,
however.20 Russian commentators emphasise that Moscow is consolidating its existing
great power status in contrast to rising powers which seek to acquire a higher rank.21
Brazil, China, India and South Africa avoid the characteristically outspoken Russian
diplomatic stance—as illustrated by their abstention from the General Assembly vote on
27 March 2014 that declared the Crimean referendum invalid—which may indicate their
attempt to avoid taking sides in the West-versus-Russia confrontation.
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Finally, I look at the justifications around the Georgian war of 2008, the importance of
the 2011 Libyan intervention for Russia’s position on Syria, and the annexation of Crimea
in 2014 to show how the evolving multipolarity discourse manifests in concrete cases. This
is to contextualise the mixture of legally warranted self-defence and the protection of the
Russian speakers in Georgia; the rage over the Libyan ‘cheating’22 when international
intervention resulted in regime change; the ensuing construction of the Russian
diplomatic triumph in Syria; and the apparent shift away from an argumentation based on
international law to justice-based legitimisations of the use of force.
Bespredel, betrayal, resistance
The 1990s are commonly seen as a time of ontological crisis23 for post-USSR Russian
society. The domestic discourse of that period, cast in terms of subjugation to the liberal
world order, exposes the strong perception of Western complicity in the trauma of the
1990s. Two themes stand out. First is bespredel,24 the lawlessness associated with the return
to an almost pre-Hobbesian state in daily life where citizens were defenceless against
criminals’ impunity. ‘The dictatorship of law’, espoused by Putin’s regime, is beyond doubt
a political claim to have put an end to the domestic bespredel of the Yeltsin era. The rule of
law is understood in this context to refer to the state’s responsibility to provide order by
direct rule, thus privileging order over individual rights and freedoms which, as the
Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov emphasises, lead ‘to loss of orientation in the domestic and
international politics’.25
The second theme in the domestic discourse is the frustrated hope of ‘catching up with
the West’: the abortive attempt to embrace democracy which was cut short by Western
betrayal,26 triggering resentment over forced dependency on the West.27 Initially instigated
by the NATO enlargement, Russia’s sense of betrayal came into sharp relief in 1999 during
the NATO campaign in Kosovo which was not mandated by a Security Council resolution.
Yeltsin describes these events as ‘the ground slipping beneath his and Russia’s feet’.28 The
Kosovo crisis marked the breakdown of his political project to ensure domestic acceptance
of Western dominance. The opposition, and subsequently Yeltsin’s own selectorate,
grabbed the opportunity to announce that the West had revealed its true face29 and the
rules established at the ColdWar’s end had unravelled.30 Henceforth, at times of normative
confrontation with the West, the insistence on international law as sole guarantor of the
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world order has been a recurring theme. It serves to emphasise formal parity with the West
vis-a`-vis Russia’s actual subordination, but also remains a tool of politico-normative
struggle from within this position.
After the NATO operation, Igor Ivanov formulated what became a default Russian
strategy, i.e. the objection to changing ‘basic principles of international law’ in order to
replace them with the doctrines of ‘limited sovereignty’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’.31
The opposition to regime change acquires a similarly moralistic tone: ‘we cannot let
hundreds of people die to control the words and actions of one man’, as Yeltsin said about
Milosevic.32 Taking sides, the argument goes, would cause inevitable suffering to the
civilian populations of the unsupported side and the ‘lawlessness will spawn more
lawlessness’.33 Thus priority needs to be given a priori to negotiation over partisanship
because a non-local has limited knowledge.34 This framing of neutrality clashes
fundamentally with the liberal interventionist impulse. As bluntly put by Venediktov, such
neutrality has one rule of thumb: ‘let them smother each other because we do not know
which one took out the knife. Then we’ll see’.35
The Kosovo campaign, while marking a low point in Russia’s identification with the
prevailing international order, also provided opportunities for symbolic retaliation against
the West’s perceived betrayal and self-assertion after a decade of submission. In March
1999, Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, on his way to Washington for an official visit,
turned his plane around over the Atlantic as an act of protest against the beginning of
NATO’s Kosovo campaign. After the campaign, during the night of 11 June 1999, the
Russian peacekeepers from the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) secretly rushed to
Pristina airport to reach it before NATO forces. In the West, both gestures were
condemned and ridiculed.36 In Russia, the combined effect was a groundswell of defiant
pride. Vladimir Lukin accurately represented the mainstream in his assertion that ‘Russia
cannot be treated like some lackey. We’re partners, not lackeys’.37
Sensitivity over status and resistance to norm imposition continues to define Russian
statements on managing international crises. In 2007, Putin’s speech at the Munich
Security Conference announced a turn towards an independent foreign policy with a
distinct role for Russia: the stabilisation of the international system through a
reaffirmation of international legal principles.38 Interpreted in the West as mere
diplomatic machismo, domestically it harkened back to the famous phrase of Russian
statesman Alexander Gorchakov who stated after the Crimean war (1853–1856): ‘Russia is
not angry but it is refocusing’.39 In the words of Sergey Lavrov, Russia ‘has returned to the
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world arena as a responsible state which can stand up for its citizens’,40 a task which is to be
prioritised over the West’s universal human rights.
Starting in the mid-1990s, Russia’s political establishment began to develop the
discourse of multipolarity as a counterweight to US unilateralism.41 First officially
formulated by then Foreign Minister Primakov,42 the doctrine is currently being
articulated by an assortment of experts43 and facilitated by the Valdai Club whose official
mission is to provide an international framework for leading experts to debate Russia’s role
in the world.44 The Russian discourse of multipolarity45 is a neo-realist interpretation of
post-bipolar international relations based on the classical view of politics as an endless
rivalry for influence.46 It posits an emerging polycentric world where the US does not play
a hegemonic role but the world system consists of a number of regional poles striving to
maintain the balance of power.47 Faithful to its US intellectual origins,48 the discourse of
multipolarity sees state sovereignty as the cornerstone of the international system and
attempts to undermine it as disruptive of global order. The responsibility of the state
extends to its duty of maintaining internal order and stability.
The Russian discourse of multipolarity does not dispute the classical neo-realist
hypothesis that multipolar systems containing especially powerful states, potential
hegemons, are the most dangerous (war-prone) systems of all.49 Rather, it uses the
metaphor of multipolarity, a notion of a distribution of power among significant poles
that are able to disrupt major political arrangements, to procure a discourse of resistance
towards ‘the liberal anti-pluralism’.50 The latter contests the idea that increasing
interdependence in the globalising world leads to ideological homogeneity synonymous
with liberal democracy. It thus objects to the liberal ‘end of history’ which assigned the role
of loser to Moscow and its sociopolitical model.51 The ongoing politics of forceful
democratisation, often justified in the name of humanitarian intervention, are seen in this
context as a tool for gaining influence and of exclusion.
What prevents the transition to a truly multipolar world order, the argument goes, is the
continuing hegemony of international norms generated during the short-lived ‘unipolar
moment’, i.e. the US’ uncontested dominance in global affairs immediately after the end of
the Cold War.52 As they were created for the benefit of the Western leaders of the ‘unipolar’
system, these ‘post-historic’ norms limit the sovereignty of weaker actors.53 Yet the
currently dominant Western normative model runs into increasing conflict with the
polycentric world under formation as the hegemonic norms show their underlying
character amid instrumentalisation by new centres of power.
Multipolarity as resistance to liberal norms 495
As is characteristic for a counter-hegemonic discourse, multipolarity contains both a
claim to an objective depiction of reality, in this case supplied by the IR theory of structural
realism, and a normative judgment and consequent political agenda for the future. As a
political project, multipolarity seeks to expose the limitation of the liberal model as a
theory and as political and cultural practice. The Russian position on international norms,
which does include a responsibility to protect, derives from this programme. It describes
‘humanitarian intervention’ as contradictory to the UN Charter and its reformulation, the
‘so-called responsibility to protect’, as an object of international ‘speculation’.54 Cast this
way, R2P is not just an ideological justification of political actions and the use of force
against select countries. It also reveals a broader political agenda which moulds basic
international norms to the liberal model and thus weakens international law which in its
current conservative rendition does not envisage legal possibilities for intervention for
reasons other than to maintain international security. The next sections look at recent
manifestations of the multipolarity resistance discourse in connection with the claim to a
responsibility to protect.
Responsibility and ideology
In Russia’s engagement with R2P, legal justification serves to imbue the claim to
responsibility with a moral right and duty to represent those unable to voice their concerns
on the global stage. Despite the professed pragmatism in Russia’s foreign policy, this re-
grounding through law consolidated as Russia’s ideology in international affairs, exposing
a characteristic co-constitution of strategic and normative aspects. Lavrov urged the
international community to establish ‘the triumph of law [ . . . ] over the revolutionary
mode of action’, exemplified in Libya by the Western pursuit of regime change under the
guise of humanitarian intervention. If Western states, he maintains, ‘continue to be over-
preoccupied with the rule-of-law within states, Russia and China have identical views on
the need to uphold the rule of international law among states’.55 To use its veto as a
custodian of international law is then ‘a responsibility vis-a`-vis the UN Charter’56 towards
those who have no representation in the Security Council. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept
spells out explicitly as unacceptable that:
[ . . . ] military interventions and other forms of external interference which
undermine the foundations of international law based on the principle of
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sovereign equality of states be carried out on the pretext of implementing the
concept of ‘responsibility to protect’.57
But as seen from Moscow, ‘somehow any intervention ends up in regime change by
NATO’.58 This reveals R2P to be linked to liberal democracy as the only solution for any
problem of intra-state political order, and thus a cover for arbitrary regime change.59 The
anxiety of the current Russian regime, heightened by the recent ‘spectre of the revolutions’
(colour revolutions in the Eurasian region and the Arab Spring), is not sufficient to explain
such sensitivity. The domestic discourse brings into play the Russian experience of regime
change: it is not always from authoritarian to democratic and it may mean bread lines and
hyperinflation.60 Indeed, ‘the biggest regime change on the planet’ (the demise of the
Soviet Union) was followed by pre-Hobbesian bespredel and ‘sovereign democracy’.
In changing regimes by force and following intervention with lengthy prescriptive state-
building, the West engages in a form of messianism which wreaks considerable havoc,
begrudgingly admitted post facto but stubbornly absent from forward policy
consideration. The Russian approach is instead ‘limited’, representing a particular
neutrality without picking favourites since ‘it may be that the government is right’.61 To be
sure, and as the case of Russian mediation in the Syrian crisis demonstrates, this claim to
neutrality is concomitantly a strategic attempt to outdoWestern support for revolutionary
action. The Russian permanent representative to the UN in New York, Vitaly Churkin,
explained vetoing a resolution for intervention in Syria by resorting to the Russian
‘political philosophy’ which rejects confrontation and cannot agree with the ‘unilateral,
accusatory bent against Damascus’.62 Even if Moscow’s claims of being the only power who
met with all the parties to the conflict63 are taken at face value, this type of neutrality has
little in common with the liberal paradigm of humanitarian action.
In the UN context, Moscow claims to express general support for R2P while working to
‘create safeguards, including international legal safeguards, to prevent obvious violations
of the concept’.64 How it does so reveals the normative saturation of strategic action,
i.e. the co-constitution of strategic framing and identity effects. Three types of practices are
most relevant here: questioning the status of R2P as a (legal) norm by emphasising the
contestation of its third pillar, namely international intervention; the separation of human
rights matters from the R2P dossier to curb the latter’s ‘creative proliferation’, premised on
the liberal notion of the individual as the referent object of security; and the promotion of
regional international organisations as legitimate interveners in a multipolar world where
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Russia seeks legitimisation for peacekeeping within the framework of the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
In the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, Russia’s major concern was to devise criteria
for the authorisation of the use of force by the UN Security Council.65 In a General
Assembly debate in 2005, it questioned the definition of ‘responsibility to protect’ as an
‘emerging norm’ and insisted that there is insufficiently wide support within the
international community for such a norm.66 In 2009, it proposed that the strategy for
implementing R2P focus on working toward a broad recognition of the concept in well-
defined terms.67 Efforts to curtail the proliferation of R2P have focused on maintaining a
certain distance between the emerging doctrine and discussions on human rights.
Although Russia conceded in the 2005 statement that human rights violations other than
genocide can be a legitimate cause for intervention by the international community, the
2009 and 2012 statements omit this admission.
In contrast with the liberal position, concerned fundamentally with the rule of law and
human rights violations within states, Russia evokes a literal reading of paragraphs 138–
139 of the World Summit outcome document to justify the commitment to sovereignty
understood as state responsibility to provide security and order within its borders.
The assistance of the international community in this task can only be auxiliary and
subordinate to the principle of non-interference. This premise is neither automatically
anti-humanitarian nor merely instrumental in Russia’s normative confrontation with the
West. It highlights instead the clash between the state-centred security discourse and the
universalist liberal principles underpinning R2P’s third pillar. Any twenty-first century
humanitarian crisis exposes these tensions and in Russian practice the caution against the
individual-centred rationalisation has tended to prevail. Illustratively, despite the initial
rhetoric of protecting the Russian population of South Ossetia, the 2008 intervention in
Georgia ultimately relied upon a self-defence justification, a standard resource in the state
security repertoire. Importantly, even the initial explanations regarding the protection of
Russian speakers focused on Russia’s responsibility as a state (a regional ‘pole’) to defend
compatriots rather than individuals facing repression.
Moscow has further campaigned for the increasing involvement of regional
organisations in early warning as well as use of force under the UN Charter. One of the
staunchest supporters of the Secretary-General’s 2011 report on the role of regional
organisations in implementing R2P,68 the Kremlin argues in favour of the expertise and
legitimacy that such actors provide. The Arab League support for the intervention in Libya
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was therefore an important factor for Russia’s decision not to block the resolution in the
Security Council. Further, the support for regional organisations to act under Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter illustrates Russia’s desire for greater relevance of the so far dormant
Russia-led CSTO, viewed with suspicion by Western governments. The multipolarity
imaginary provides the context within which the campaign for greater regional hegemony
may redress the imbalance of the current world order.
The UN forum thus serves as part of Russia’s larger opposition to the expansion of
Western liberal norms, which are seen to undermine the system of sovereign democracy
within an emerging multipolar (or polycentric, as commonly used by Russian experts)
world order. The specific contestation of the humanitarian interpretation of R2P
represents a strategic manifestation of Russia’s normative aims. Part of this agenda is a
notion of responsibility to protect within a ‘pole’, for strategic and normative reasons.
In the UN, this agenda also shows in Moscow’s support for humanitarian resolutions that
address crises outside of the Russian regional ‘pole’, resulting in Moscow’s backing of
mandates for recent and ongoing humanitarian interventions in Central and West Africa
(Central African Republic, South Sudan and Mali). The next section looks briefly at the
normative mismatches between the liberal universalist underpinnings of R2P and Russia’s
own understandings of responsibility which stem from the multipolarity discourse.
Resistance in practice
Georgia
Russia’s mobilisation of responsibility to protect in its Georgian intervention in 2008
appears to be a transgression of the professed Russian position on military intervention.
It thus invites an explanation in terms of the instrumentalisation of the humanitarian
cause. Much of the analysis indeed emphasises hypocrisy and abuse in the Russian
justification of the Georgian intervention,69 referring in particular to Putin’s statement
after his return from South Ossetia in early August 2008 which included mentions of
genocide against the local population. The normative mismatch that occurs here is in fact
the extension of the liberal paradigm into the Russian discourse. The Russian use of
humanitarian language was seen as R2P’s ‘third pillar’ justification, i.e. acting on the
responsibility of the international community to intervene, which was, however,
performed unilaterally and out of particularistic interests. Yet Moscow’s argument about
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the protection of its citizens belonged to the state-centred paradigm of security.70
Problematic as it is given the phenomenon of ‘passportisation’ in the region, the claim still
reflects the idea that the responsibility to protect is a task of the state rather than the
international community acting on liberal principles of human security in which the
referent object of security is the individual regardless of their citizenship. Lavrov
epitomises this approach in saying that:
[ . . . ] according to our [Russian] Constitution there is also a responsibility to
protect—the term which is very widely used in the UN when people see some
trouble in Africa or in any remote part of other regions. But this is not Africa to
us, this is next door. This is an area where Russian citizens live. So the
Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian Federation
make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise a responsibility to protect.71
The instrumentality thesis which interprets Russia’s use of humanitarian language as
abuse underestimates the normative structures of Russian authorities engaged in strategic
interaction. It dismisses as manipulation the domestically held sentiment that the crisis was
‘painful to watch’ for the Russian public which ‘feels very close to the nations in the post-
Soviet republics’.72 It also conceals the confusion among the establishment in wake of
post-facto rationalisations.73Medvedev evenmade a slip of the tongue, calling the operation
‘ponuzhdenye k miru’, although such an expression does not exist (there is prinuzhdenye k
miru—peace enforcement).74 The ultimate procurement of the legal justification for action
was however not random. TheMinistry for Foreign Affairs decided to call it self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter’.75 In the Russian discourse of resistance, the
appeal to international law was still more important than references to the protection of
compatriots, which would prove central in the annexation of Crimea.
Libya and Syria
The interrelated cases of Libya and Syria exhibit a number of practices particular to the
Russian resistance discourse of multipolarity. In domestic politics, the Russian decision
not to veto the Security Council resolution authorising military intervention in Libya
(resolution 1973) was compared with ‘the 1999 turnaround over the Atlantic’, suggesting a
radical change from the usual position towards international intervention for
humanitarian purposes,76 which never materialised. Putin reproached the then prime
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minister Medvedev for Russia’s complicity in the operation which he called ‘a medieval call
for a crusade’,77 and seized the occasion to contest the Western interpretation of
humanitarian intervention, while emphasising the Russian responsibility to defend
international law. As expected in Moscow, Libya confirmed the Western pattern which
‘starts with a nice formula [no-fly zone] but in the end the leader is killed and the regime is
changed’.78
The exploitation of UN Security Council resolution 1973 by the US and NATO, who
orchestrated the removal of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, gave Russia ample opportunity
for ideological criticism.79 It quickly protested against ‘a twisted interpretation of the
Security Council resolution’80 and accused the West of hypocrisy and betrayal: NATO’s
supposedly civil-minded bombing brought about civilian losses and the Western
declarations of stopping short of regime change proved hollow. Russian authorities were
particularly troubled by how NATO appropriated the language of R2P to serve unilateral
political purposes and raised concerns that ‘the Libya model’ would become part of
subsequent NATO strategy, undermining ‘the very foundation of the world order’.81 It was
agreed in Moscow that ‘the Libya model’ should not be repeated in Syria.82 The alleged
prevention of this scenario via Russian diplomatic channels held therefore as much
symbolic as strategic importance. Unsurprisingly, Putin cited this rationale in his appeals
to the value of international law,83 which tends to be interpreted in Western analysis as
dogged political support for the Assad government.
Within the multipolarity discourse these two are interlinked: the conservative rationale
of international law is a political tool to maintain the regional balance of power. The
toppling of the Assad regime would upset such a balance but the person of Assad is not
important per se. Consistent with its anti-liberal approach, Moscow argued that the
violent conflict should be treated not as a one-sided repression of innocent civilians but as
a civil war.84 The use of the civilian protection argument to rationalise forceful and direct
intervention instead of negotiation (‘the Libyan precedent’) would equate to partisan
intercession in a civil war. In contrast, Russia advertised its diplomatic efforts in the Syrian
conflict as part of the UNmediation, and the Geneva Communique85 became the centre of
its investment.86 The biggest boost to the Russian framing came in September 2013, when
Putin capitalised on a possible gaffe by Kerry saying that the only way for Assad to avoid a
strike was to turn over his entire chemical arsenal. Moscow proposed that Syria surrender
its chemical weapons to an international commission headed by the UN, and Assad
quickly agreed.87
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Crimea
The reasons given for the swift annexation of Crimea in March 2014 include the protection
of the Russian speakers, as well as the strong historical and cultural ties to the peninsula.88
The difference in the interpretation of protection is well captured byMichael Ignatieff who
construed the Russian argumentation as an abuse of R2P since the doctrine presupposes
universal protection of civilians regardless of nationality.89 The Russian defence refers to
the moral obligation of protecting compatriots on the territory of the former Soviet Union
and prior to it the Russian empire.90 This is a consistent rationalisation in Russia’s
resistance discourse of multipolarity which links the duty to contain Western hegemony
with the state responsibility to protect. More particularly for the crisis around Crimea, the
rhetoric shifts away from the focus on international law to arguments about justice.
In his speech to justify Russia’s action on the peninsula, Putin introduces extra-legal
arguments which hitherto had hardly been present in his discourse.91 This may indicate
that Russian authorities now feel confident enough to move past the international law
argument. Fyodor Lukyanov, the Chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign and
Defence Policy, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine and a prominent
member of the Valdai Club, represents a widely-held domestic opinion in saying that the
Crimean referendum has put an end to the post-Soviet Union period. He characteristically
describes that ‘bygone’ era as having ‘buried the dreams of equal rapprochement and
mutual ideological enrichment, and [given] the winning side the right to interpret human
values and the rules of international relations at will’.92
Whether in a more militant way as an announcement of the crushing defeat of the
West,93 or an opportunity to re-evaluate policy in the post-Soviet space in the pursuit of ‘a
fairer world order’,94 domestic representations of the Kremlin’s action in Crimea
demonstrate a normative confrontation that calls for a redress after 25 years of
humiliation. The resistance discourse of multipolarity remains the core of this
conservative opposition to the liberal Western dominance. While one may want to
control for the impact of propaganda, the views of the citizens are not at odds with these
representations. According to the independent Levada Centre’s poll conducted between
21 and 24 March 2014, ‘the Russians got offended at the West for Ukraine’, with 61 per cent
expressing hostility against the US and 53 per cent against the EU.95
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Conclusion
In order to explain the derivation and substance of Russia’s position on R2P, this article
eschewed the analytic scheme of a hypocritical or backward Russia. It also refrained from
tracking to what extent Russia has advanced—or has failed to advance—from a traditional
pluralist to a solidarist liberal ideology of international society, an analysis which would be
in linewith a progressive and linear understanding of norm evolution. Rather, the article has
been guided by two other conceptual premises of analysis: the co-constitution of domestic
representations and foreign policy choices, and the normative saturation of strategic action.
The aim has been to make sense of the specific normative commitments that underpin
Moscow’s strategic contestations of R2P. This is contextualised by placing domestic
representations of Russia’s identity within a larger resistance discourse of multipolarity.
Formulated at the juncture of academia and policy beginning in the mid-1990s, the
Russian multipolarity discourse employs the neo-realist theory of IR to promote a political
agenda which contests the Western model of liberal normative order which is seen as
having been imposed upon Russia in its moment of weakness. The normative substance
embedded in this agenda has evolved, from a frustrated attempt to embrace Western
norms after the demise of the Soviet Union which bred Russia’s sentiment of betrayal, to a
growing protest against the dominance of norms generated during the ‘unilateral
moment’, to the explicit counter-hegemonic posturing that marks Russia’s normative
contestation today. This revisionist posture, which thrives on resentment, is an important
product of the multipolarity discourse of resistance. Too often, however, it is reduced in
political analysis to simply an outcome of pure instrumentalisation. In truth, the strategic
and the normative cannot be so easily disentangled in Moscow’s contestation of R2P.
In opposition to the liberal notion of a universal responsibility to protect any individual
facing oppression, Moscow emphasises other principles: the responsibility of the state to
protect its citizens, the responsibility of its position as permanent member of the Security
Council to uphold international law, and the responsibility to represent the unrepresented.All
these components have been problematised. The most controversial has been the practice of
creating Russian citizens through ‘passportisation’ within the self-proclaimed Russian ‘pole’
and instrumentalisation of international law. Importantly, the Kremlin’s practices of
exercising its self-defined responsibilities do not follow a coherent agenda if judged in rational
terms. Instead, they are a reflection ofRussia’s identity at the nexus of domestic representation
and foreign policy and a manifestation of vital interests of the Kremlin.
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Pursuit of this agenda conjures up the overarching duty that Russia bestows upon itself,
namely the responsibility to contain Western hegemony. The rage which has recently
accompanied this pursuit may win the support of some of the staunchest ideological
opponents of the West in the Global South. But it can also challenge the claim that Russia
serves as a responsible ‘pole’ in a genuinely polycentric world order. The opinion of the
Chinese representative to the UN after the General Assembly vote on the validity of the
Crimean referendum is illustrative: while he questioned the rationality of the vote and
ultimately abstained from it, he also emphasised that ‘all parties should exercise restraint
and [ . . . ] continue the efforts to iron out their differences through political and
diplomatic means’.96
As this discussion suggests, normative mismatches will continue to persist in norm
contestation as they reveal deep-seated commitments which translate into concrete
political practices. These tend to be discarded as strategic abuse by liberal advocates of R2P.
Such statements are themselves displays of a particular political agenda which holds other
interpretations to account derived from its very presuppositions but deems itself universal.
As the Russian example illustrates, adopting such assumptions as an objective measure in
scholarly debate conceals the inbuilt political leanings.
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